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Abstract 
We investigate the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding 
minimum contribution level in a linear public goods game. Groups either face the minimum 
level exogenously imposed by a central authority or are allowed to decide for themselves by 
means of a group vote whether or not a minimum level should be implemented. We find a 
binding minimum contribution level to have a positive and substantially significant effect on 
cooperation. The main impact is on the extensive margin, meaning that it is possible to force 
free riders to increase their contribution without crowding out others’ voluntary contributions. 
This result is robust to the mode of implementation and thus when the minimum level is 
enforceable, it is a simple policy that will increase provision of the public good.  
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1 Introduction 
Free riding is a frequently discussed reason for creating institutions to increase contributions 
to public goods. To reduce the problem of under-provision of public goods, formal institutions 
are often established. Many of these institutions focus specifically on the free riders or those 
who contribute a small amount to the public good for example by allowing punishment (e.g., 
see overview in Chaudhuri, 2011).1 In real life, however, the most frequently used institution 
to combat free riders is to require some minimum contribution level. For example when it 
comes to the environment, there are certain standards for emissions from cars and for 
recycling at household level. Entrance fees to museums or national parks, and workload in 
teams, are other examples. The most common example is probably the financing of public 
goods such as health care and schools through taxation. The focus of this paper is whether a 
minimum level per se helps to increase contributions to a public good. Alternatively, these 
public goods could be provided in a regime without any minimum standards for cars or 
entrance fees, and rely solely on voluntary contributions. From an institutional design point of 
view, the question is whether a binding minimum level results in crowding out and whether 
the way the institution is implemented affects contribution levels. The objective of this paper 
is to investigate, by using a public goods experiment, the effect (i) of imposing a minimum 
contribution level for a public good and (ii) of the mode of implementation, i.e., whether the 
way the minimum level is introduced, either endogenously by majority voting or 
exogenously, affects contributions. 
Binding minimum contribution levels have been studied experimentally with mixed results in 
terms of how levels of contributions to public goods have been affected. For instance, 
Andreoni (1993) and Gronberg et al. (2012) find that minimum levels increase contributions 
in public goods games with concave payoff functions and Chan et al. (2002) find the same 
effect but furthermore that it wears off as the minimum level is increased. Conversely, Kocher 
et al. (2016) implement minimum levels in a linear public goods game, and for a low 
minimum level they find no effect on public good provision whereas for a higher minimum 
level they find an overall positive effect. Moreover, the effects are qualitatively similar when 
the minimum level is endogenously imposed by one randomly selected group member. Keser 
et al. (2014) investigate minimum levels in a linear public goods experiment with endowment 
                                                 
1 There are also experiments focusing on incentivizing people to give a high amount by allowing rewards (e.g., 
Sefton et al., 2007).  
heterogeneity and find that the minimum level increases public good provision if subjects 
with a higher endowment face a higher minimum level.2 Furthermore, a recent set of 
interesting papers use minimum levels to study strategic aspects of international negotiations 
concerning global public goods provision (e.g., climate protection). For example, Dannenberg 
(2012) and Dannenberg et al. (2014) study coalition formation in light of subsequent 
introduction of a minimum contribution level within this coalition, and Kesternich et al. 
(2014a,b) and Gallier et al. (2014) implement minimum contribution levels in settings where 
subjects are heterogeneous with respect to their endowment or their marginal per capita return 
from the public good.3 Common among the latter set of papers is the feature that subjects 
simultaneously propose a minimum contribution level and the lowest level proposed is 
subsequently implemented. 
When a minimum level is introduced, subjects who contribute below this level need to 
increase their contributions at least to the imposed level. But how do subjects who contribute 
to the public good above the minimum level even in the absence of such a mechanism react 
when the minimum level is implemented? These subjects could be crowded out, meaning that 
they voluntary decrease their contribution to the public good, e.g., from 50% to 40% of their 
endowment, or they could be crowded in, meaning that they voluntary increase their 
contribution to the public good, e.g., from 50% to 60% of their endowment. One reason for 
the latter effect could be that subjects are conditional cooperators, i.e., they want to cooperate 
if others cooperate and vice versa (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001) and therefore they increase 
their public good contribution since free riders are forced to increase their contribution at least 
up to the imposed minimum level. Several factors could result in crowding out. The 
implemented minimum level could serve as a focal point regarding which contribution level is 
expected. This could affect people in two ways: either directly by making them choose to 
contribute the minimum level or indirectly by making them believe that other group members 
will see the minimum level as a focal point. Crowding out could also be due to a “hidden cost 
of control,” i.e., subjects do not like the control exerted upon them and therefore reduce their 
contribution. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Ziegelmeyer et al. (2012) implement principal-
agent experiments where agents receive a fixed wage and can choose to engage in a 
production activity that is costly to the agent but beneficial to the principal; the “hidden cost 
                                                 
2 For public goods experiments using non-binding minimum levels, see, e.g., Galbiati and Vertova (2008) and 
Riedel and Schildberg-Hörisch (2013). 
3 A related paper is Gerber et al. (2013), who examine minimum requirements with respect to formation of the 
coalition itself. 
of control” amounts to the degree to which agents reduce their efforts when the principal 
implements a minimum performance requirement. The effect is strong in the former study but 
somewhat weaker in the latter (where it is dominated by the positive effect of forcing low-
performing agents to increase their effort). This effect is potentially magnified by subjects’ 
beliefs about others’ reactions following the introduction of the minimum contribution level. 
If hidden costs of control are pervasive, there is a risk that they will partly or even completely 
offset the direct effect of the minimum contribution level (forcing free riders to increase their 
contribution). In this case, legitimizing the minimum level by granting local decision rights to 
groups may be critical in order to achieve a more successful outcome. We test this by 
allowing groups to decide for themselves whether or not the minimum level should be 
implemented. In more detail, we study experimentally the implementation of a minimum 
contribution level in a linear public goods game.4 Groups either face the minimum level 
exogenously imposed by a central authority or are allowed to choose whether or not to 
implement it based on the outcome of majority voting. 
A growing experimental literature examines how centralized institutions with exogenous 
power to implement policies can increase cooperation in social-dilemma situations. In this 
setting, the degree of crowding out due to hidden costs of control and whether it can be 
alleviated through endogenous institutional formation is still an open empirical question, 
which we address in the current paper. We find a minimum contribution level to have a 
positive and substantial effect on cooperation. The main impact is on the extensive margin, 
meaning that it is possible to force free riders to increase their contribution without crowding 
out others’ voluntary contributions. This result is robust to the mode of implementation; that 
is, exogenous minimum levels are as effective as endogenous minimum levels. This result 
stands in contrast to several recent papers documenting that endogenously chosen institutions 
do alleviate collective-action problems to a larger extent than when the same institutions are 
exogenously imposed. Tyran and Feld (2006) let subjects vote on the introduction of a law 
that prescribes full contribution to the public good. They find that a “mild law,” which is 
                                                 
4 The main difference between our design using a linear payoff function and other experimental studies of 
minimum levels that instead use concave payoff functions (e.g., Andreoni, 1993; Chan et al., 2002; Gronberg et 
al., 2012) is that the minimum level is set above rather than below the Nash equilibrium. This is important since 
we want to consider the issue of conditional cooperation in combination with hidden costs of control and these 
potential effects become more salient with linear payoff functions. Papers using concave payoff functions have 
studied a different question, namely the neutrality of government spending with respect to privately provided 
public goods (Warr, 1982; Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni, 1989, 1990). 
backed up by a non-deterrent sanction, is more effective when chosen endogenously than 
when exogenously imposed. Dal Bó et al. (2010) introduce the possibility for subjects to 
endogenously impose a fine on unilateral defection in a prisoners’ dilemma game, and find 
that this increases cooperation compared with the same fine exogenously imposed. Sutter et 
al. (2010), Markussen et al. (2014a), and Kamei et al. (2015) find that peer-to-peer 
punishment can sustain high levels of cooperation to a greater extent when democratically 
chosen than when exogenously imposed. However, Markussen et al. (2014b) find no effect of 
endogenous institutional choice. They investigate the effect of intergroup competition on local 
public good provision within groups, and find that competition is as effective if endogenously 
chosen as if exogenously imposed. Likewise, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2004) extend 
Andreoni (1993) by introducing endogenous taxation on public good contributions and find 
no positive effect on contributions compared with exogenous taxation. Taken together, the 
benefit of granting groups participation rights seems to be context dependent and we discuss 
our results in light of this in a concluding section of the paper. 
A majority of the groups in the endogenous treatment in our experiment successfully 
implement the minimum-level institution. This is in line with several other papers that 
examine endogenous institutional choice and find that groups – when given the freedom of 
choice – successfully implement efficiency-enhancing institutions. In Kroll et al. (2007), 
subjects submit proposals for how much everyone should contribute to the public good. Then 
they vote on the proposals and if one proposal receives sufficient support it is implemented. 
They find that when the vote is binding, it results in high levels of public good provision. 
Putterman et al. (2011) let subjects vote on the parameters of a centralized punishment 
scheme in the context of public good provision and find that most groups are able to 
implement a scheme where it is optimal for everyone to contribute their entire endowment. In 
Markussen et al. (2014a), groups endogenously choose between different types of punishment 
schemes. They find that most groups are able to implement low cost and deterrent sanctions, 
which can increase public good provision. Kosfeld et al. (2009) implement public goods 
experiments where groups can form an organization in which all members must contribute 
their entire endowment to the public good, while subjects in the group not covered by the 
organization can contribute as they wish. They find that contributions and welfare are higher 
when groups are allowed to form organizations. Finally, in Ertan et al. (2009), subjects 
endogenously choose the rules for peer-to-peer punishment. They find that most groups 
eventually implement a scheme that allows them to achieve high levels of public good 
provision.5 
2 Experimental design 
We use a linear public goods experiment with a design similar to the one developed by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) and where the main characteristic is that the strategy method is used. 
Each group consists of three randomly matched members, and the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) from the public good is 0.5. For a rational and selfish subject, an MPCR below one 
results in a dominant strategy to free ride, i.e., to contribute zero to the public good. However, 
since MPCR*n > 1, where n is number of group members, it is socially optimal to contribute 
the whole endowment. Thus, our choice of marginal per capita return creates the conflict 
between private and social optima that characterizes a public good. Each subject has an 
endowment of 20 tokens, and we denote c the amount invested in the public good. Thus, the 
payoff for subject i is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 20− 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 0.5∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗3𝑗𝑗=1  .   (1) 
The key difference between the Fischbacher et al. design and standard public goods 
experiments is that the former employs the strategy method. The subjects make two different 
types of decisions on how much they would like to contribute to the public good – one 
unconditional and one conditional. In the unconditional decision, the subject states how much 
she would like to contribute to the public good as in a standard public goods experiment. The 
conditional contribution to the public good is the amount a subject would like to contribute 
conditional on the other two group members’ average contribution. Each subject makes 21 
conditional decisions in total, one for each integer number from 0 to 20, representing all the 
possible (integer) averages of the other two group members. All contribution decisions are 
incentive compatible since the payoff-relevant decision for two randomly selected members 
of the group is the unconditional contribution, and by using their average unconditional 
contribution, the contribution of the third member is determined as the conditional 
contribution for that specific average contribution.  
The experiment consists of two stages, both of which are based on the design by Fischbacher 
et al. (2001): (i) a standard public goods experiment and (ii) a public goods experiment where 
                                                 
5 See also Dal Bó (2014) for an overview of the experimental literature on collective action and the effects of 
democratic institutions. 
a minimum contribution level is either exogenously or endogenously imposed. There are two 
treatments in the experiments: an exogenously imposed minimum contribution level and an 
endogenously imposed minimum contribution level. In the exogenous treatment, a minimum 
contribution level of 5 tokens is imposed, while in the endogenous treatment the 
implementation of a minimum level of 5 tokens is subject to a group vote. There is no cost of 
voting, and the voting is made mandatory. A majority rule determines the outcome, and thus 
if at least 2 out of the 3 group members vote for the minimum contribution level of 5 tokens it 
is imposed, and vice versa.  
To test for the impact of a minimum contribution level, we run two types of sessions. Both of 
them begin with the baseline game described in the previous paragraph (and without any 
minimum level). In sessions with the exogenous treatment, the standard public goods 
experiment is followed by the same game but now exogenously imposing the rule that 
everyone must contribute at least 5 tokens to the public good. In sessions with the endogenous 
treatment, the standard public goods experiment is instead followed by a voting stage where 
each member casts a vote on whether or not they would like to introduce a minimum level of 
5 tokens. Thus, the majority outcome of the vote determines whether or not a minimum level 
is imposed. This means that the baseline game is followed by either the standard public goods 
experiment again or the same experiment but with a minimum level of 5 tokens depending on 
the majority decision in the voting stage. We use perfect stranger matching and the subjects 
are not informed about the outcome of the first public goods experiment until the final 
payment is made.6 This is clearly stated in the instructions given to the subjects.7 Thus, we 
will be able to document the importance of participation rights if the endogenous minimum 
level either increases contributions to a larger extent or decreases contributions to a lesser 
extent than does the exogenous minimum level. 
The logistics of the experiment were as follows. The standard public goods experiment was 
first explained and then conducted. The experiment instructions included examples and 
individual exercises to be solved to ensure that subjects understood the setup. Upon 
completion of the exercises, they were also solved in public by the experimenter in order to 
                                                 
6 We do not test for order effects. The reason is that the imposed order is natural, in the sense that we are 
interested in the effect of a minimum-level policy when subjects are experienced with the baseline (voluntary 
contribution mechanism). This is what typically happens in reality: a collective-action problem is identified and 
a remedy – the minimum level – is sought and implemented. Differences across treatments are tested as the 
difference between within-subject estimates. 
7 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
facilitate understanding. Questions were answered in private throughout the experiments. The 
subjects were randomized into a session with either exogenous or endogenous imposition of 
the minimum level. The voting stage preceded the second public goods game in sessions with 
the endogenous treatment, where subjects were asked to vote either for or against imposition 
of a minimum contribution level of 5 tokens. The exogenous treatment was identical except 
for the voting, and thus a paragraph was excluded from the instructions, which otherwise were 
exactly the same. After both experiments were finished, we elicited each subject’s belief 
about others’ contributions; subjects were asked to guess the average contribution of the other 
group members, and correct guesses were monetarily rewarded. Note that the outcome of the 
public goods experiment was not revealed to the subjects until the end of the experiment. 
Finally, subjects answered a post-experiment questionnaire related to socio-economic 
background factors. The experiment was conducted in a total of six sessions at the University 
of Gothenburg using pen and paper. Subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). 
An experimental session lasted on average 90 minutes, and one token corresponded to 2 SEK 
(at the time of the experiment corresponding to 0.30 USD). A total of 144 subjects 
participated, 51 in the exogenous treatment and 93 in the endogenous treatment,8 each earning 
an average of 150 SEK (22.50 USD). 
3 Results 
We begin the analyses by focusing on the unconditional contributions, which are summarized 
in Table 1. In the standard public goods experiment, the averages of the unconditional 
contributions are very similar among the subjects who in the second stage were allocated to 
either the exogenous or the endogenous treatment, i.e., 8.35 and 8.24 tokens, respectively. The 
small difference in contributions is insignificant, indicating that the randomization of subjects 
between treatments was successful (Mann-Whitney U test; p = 0.93).9 The contribution levels 
in the standard public goods experiment correspond to slightly more than 40% of the 
endowment, which is in line with other public goods experiments (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; 
Zelmer, 2004). As expected, contribution levels are higher in the public goods experiment 
with minimum levels (MCL). When the minimum level is exogenously imposed, the average 
contribution goes up to 9.43, implying a statistically significant increase of 1.08 tokens 
                                                 
8 We choose a larger sample size in the endogenous treatment to avoid too few groups voting in favor of 
imposing the minimum level.  
9 We report from two-sided tests throughout the paper. 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p = 0.01). In the endogenous treatment, the corresponding effect 
is a 0.85-unit increase in average contribution and again the effect is significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test; p < 0.01). 
In the endogenous treatment, the group members voted about imposing a minimum 
contribution level of 5 tokens. A majority of the subjects voted in favor of the minimum level. 
Of the 93 subjects in the endogenous treatment, 75 (81%) voted in favor of the minimum 
contribution level and 18 voted against it. Correspondingly, 27 of the 31 groups (87%) voted 
for imposing a minimum contribution level. Interestingly, we find that men are much more 
likely to vote no. Fourteen of the 18 no-voters (78%) are men; in total, 28% of the men but 
only 10% of the women oppose the minimum-level institution by vote. The difference in 
proportions is significant at the 5% level (Kruskal-Wallis test; p = 0.03). 
The attractive feature of a minimum contribution level is that it forces any free riders, or low 
contributors, to increase their contribution up to the imposed mandatory minimum. In addition 
to this effect, subjects contributing more than the imposed minimum can voluntarily adjust 
their contribution: they are crowded in if they voluntarily increase their contribution and 
crowded out if they voluntarily decrease their contribution. For example, subjects could be 
crowded out since the minimum level can signal distrust similar to the hidden cost of control 
in Falk and Kosfeld (2006), or it may serve as a focal point. Conditional cooperators can also 
be crowded in, since the minimum level forces free riders to increase their contribution, or 
they can be crowded out due to the belief that others will react negatively to the hidden costs 
of control or due to the belief that the minimum level will serve as a focal point. Thus, the 
overall effect is ex-ante unclear and we analyze the effect of the minimum level conditional 
on the contributions in the baseline case.  
The main behavioral difference between the exogenous and endogenous treatments is that the 
hidden costs of control can be avoided in the latter case since subjects can decide for 
themselves on institution formation rather than being forced to contribute the minimum level. 
That is, when groups are given the freedom of choice, do they on average increase their public 
good contribution to a larger extent than groups not given this opportunity? We investigate 
this by comparing the impact of a minimum provision level between the exogenous and 
endogenous treatments. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect of endogenous 
institutional choice; the difference (in differences) between the treatments is 0.04 tokens in 
public good contributions (Mann-Whitney U test; p = 0.57). Thus, the feature of having the 
possibility to choose institution has a zero net effect on contributions. This seems to indicate 
that the main driver of the result is the direct effect of increased contributions from free riders 
and low contributors, which we analyze in more detail below. 
Result 1. Minimum contribution levels have a significantly positive effect on public good 
contributions. 
Result 2. A majority of the groups implemented the minimum level in the endogenous 
treatment. 
Result 3. The endogenous and exogenous treatments have similar significant positive effects 
on public good contributions, indicating a low net effect of hidden costs of control.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows contributions and beliefs in the two treatments. In both the exogenous and the 
endogenous treatment, subjects increase their belief about others’ contribution when the 
minimum level is implemented (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; p < 0.01 in either case). One 
advantage in the endogenous treatment is that subjects are free to decide whether or not to 
impose the minimum level. If the hidden cost of control is expected to be a substantial 
problem in the case of exogenous minimum levels, there are mainly two positive effects of 
endogenous formation of (minimum-level) institutions. First, if individuals value the freedom 
of choice per se, the hidden cost of control might be overall reduced when groups are granted 
the right to decide for themselves whether or not to introduce minimum levels. Second, some 
individuals might be more control averse than others. Thus, by allowing for endogenous 
formation of minimum-level institutions, those groups where the exogenous minimum level 
would be most likely to crowd out voluntary contributions are allowed to endogenously opt 
out, by voting against the implementation. 
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows the changes in contributions and beliefs by voting and 
group decision in the endogenous treatment. By and large, subjects should vote yes unless 
they believe that contributions were already at substantial levels (“high beliefs” hereafter) in 
the baseline (or if they are risk averse and uncertain about the accuracy of their high beliefs) 
or they have a strong aversion against control.10 A yes-vote signals that individuals are (i) 
                                                 
10 To a selfish player with high beliefs, the minimum level will only have a direct effect on own contributions 
(which she will be forced to increase), and, furthermore, a yes-vote does not work as a “bait strategy” since 
selfish and believe that others contribute at low levels (the minimum level is a Pareto 
improvement), (ii) conditional cooperators who believe that others contribute at low levels 
(the minimum level enforces conditional cooperation at higher contribution levels), and/or 
(iii) not strongly averse to control. Thus, in a Yes-Yes group (“yes” for own and group vote, 
respectively), we expect an increase in both contributions and beliefs about others’ 
contributions, since subjects who vote yes are either selfish or conditional cooperators and 
either type would respond by an increase in contributions and believe that others in the group 
do the same. This is what we see in Table 2: For the 72 individuals who voted yes and ended 
up in a group where the majority voted yes, contributions and beliefs significantly increase 
following the implementation of the minimum level (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; p < 0.01 in 
either case). No-voters who nevertheless end up in a group where the majority voted yes (No-
Yes) face the same restriction ex-post, i.e., the minimum level. For these individuals, the 
impact on own contributions should be negative if the individual voted no due to a strong 
aversion against control, but not if the no-vote was due to a fear that others in the group were 
averse toward control, since they seem not to be since they voted yes. The predicted change in 
contribution is thus ambiguous for this group, and we cannot reject a null hypothesis of no 
change when the minimum level is implemented (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; p = 0.63). In 
neither of the two bottom rows of the table (No-No and Yes-No) do we expect much of a 
change in contributions or beliefs since the minimum level is not implemented. This is also in 
line with the results in the table.11 
We have argued that the hidden cost of control is the main reason for voting against the 
minimum level, either directly or indirectly due to a fear that others will react negatively, and 
find that the results in Table 2 point in this direction since subjects in Yes-Yes groups on 
average increase their contributions under minimum levels more than subjects in No-Yes 
groups. Interestingly, No-Yes groups do not increase their contributions more than No-No 
                                                                                                                                                        
conditional cooperators are already contributing substantially (according to her belief). To a conditional 
cooperator with high beliefs, the minimum level will not have a strong direct effect on others’ contributions 
since according to her belief, nobody is free riding. Furthermore, a subject with high beliefs about others’ 
contributions might be more likely to fear that others will be crowded out due to the hidden costs of control (and 
therefore vote no). However, if subjects are uncertain about the accuracy of their beliefs, risk-averse individuals 
might still vote yes in order to hedge against the possibility that their high beliefs are wrong. 
11 In No-No groups, the minimum level is not implemented and this is in line with the own vote (the subject got 
what she wanted). In Yes-No groups, if the individual is a pessimistic conditional cooperator (and hence voted 
yes), there is no expected increase in others’ contributions to respond to, and if the individual was selfish and 
voted yes because of an expected increase in everyone’s contributions, we would not expect a behavioral 
response regardless (we would only expect a forced increase in contributions if the minimum level were to be 
implemented). 
groups even though in the former, free riders and low contributors are forced to contribute at 
least at the minimum level. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Result 4. When a group majority decides to implement the minimum contribution level, 
subjects voting yes increase their contributions significantly more than subjects voting no, 
while there is no significant difference in contribution behavior between the two groups of 
voters in the standard public goods experiment. 
Subjects could be crowded out or crowded in by the minimum level and here we investigate 
this issue in more detail. We plot individual contributions before and after the minimum 
provision level is imposed in the exogenous (Figure 1) and endogenous (Figure 2) treatments, 
respectively.12 In the figures, on the x-axis we show contribution in the standard public goods 
game, while on the y-axis we show the contribution when the minimum level is imposed. Any 
observation below the 45-degree line shows a higher contribution in the baseline than when 
the minimum level is imposed, i.e., crowding out, whereas any observation above the 45-
degree line shows crowding in for subjects who contributed at least 5 tokens in the baseline, 
i.e., the imposed minimum level. The figures indicate substantial individual heterogeneity as 
to whether subjects are crowded in, crowded out, or unaffected by the minimum level. 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Tables 3–5 add more detailed information. Table 3 shows that 49% and 43% increased their 
contribution under the minimum level in the exogenous and endogenous treatment, 
respectively, and this corresponds to the number of observations above the 45-degree line in 
Figures 1 and 2. Conversely, 20% and 17% decreased their contribution in the respective 
treatment. The positive effect clearly dominates, and we know this from Result 1, but the 
values include the direct effect of forcing free riders and low contributors to contribute at least 
the enforced minimum. Therefore, in Tables 4 and 5 we separate out this direct effect (top 
row) from subjects’ behavioral responses to the minimum level, for the exogenous and 
endogenous treatment, respectively. In the exogenous treatment (Table 4), 23% of the subjects 
contributed nothing in the standard public goods experiment and exactly 5 tokens when this 
was the enforced minimum, and 8% increased their contribution from 5 to an average of 8.25 
                                                 
12 From here on we drop the four groups in the endogenous treatment in which the majority voted against the 
minimum level. 
tokens under the minimum level, indicating that they were crowded in. Conversely, 12% of 
subjects reduced their contribution from an average contribution of 8.83 in the baseline all the 
way down to the enforced minimum level, and they were thus crowded out by the minimum 
level. The average contribution of the remaining 49% was virtually unchanged. The pattern is 
similar for the endogenous treatment (Table 5), with the main difference that crowding out is 
stronger: 10% of the subjects drop from an average of 11.38 all the way down to the enforced 
minimum of 5 tokens. By and large, crowding in seems to occur mainly at low levels of 
standard public goods contributions, which perhaps was caused by pessimistic conditional 
contributors, whereas crowding out is more likely for subjects who already contribute 
substantially to the public good. However, for many subjects, the average contribution is 
rather stable and thus the main share of the positive overall minimum-level effect 
demonstrated in Table 1 comes from the direct effect of pushing free riders and low 
contributors up to the minimum level. For behavioral responses beyond this, the net effect is 
more or less zero on average. 
Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 about here 
Result 5. Minimum contribution levels effectively work on the extensive margin; there is no 
evidence that it will serve to crowd out voluntary contributions to the public good. 
Previous empirical research has suggested that a large fraction of people are conditional 
cooperators, i.e., they cooperate if others cooperate and vice versa (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 
2001). The unconditional results in Table 2 indicate a correlation between contributions and 
beliefs. In Figures 3 and 4, we explore how contributions match beliefs about others’ 
contributions. The difference in contributions between the MCL public goods experiment and 
the standard public goods experiment (y-axis) is plotted against the corresponding difference 
in beliefs about others’ contributions (x-axis). On average, individuals who believe that the 
aggregate public good provision will increase also increase their own contribution. For those 
who instead believe in a reduction of contributions, the opposite is true, i.e., they decrease 
their own contribution. Behavior in our experiment is thus consistent with the notion of 
conditional cooperation. 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
The other part of the public goods experiment elicited conditional contributions.13 Conditional 
contributions are elicited using a variant of the strategy method. The main advantage with this 
procedure is that we can control for subjects’ beliefs about others’ contributions in an 
incentive-compatible way using the strategy method and furthermore classify subjects into 
different contributor types. We can thus in more detail analyze the direct impact of the policy 
on subjects’ cooperative preferences. For instance, those who in the baseline contribute 
substantially to the public good regardless of others’ contributions might shift their schedule 
downwards due to hidden costs of control; or conditional cooperators might shift their 
schedule upwards at low levels of others’ average contribution if they like the idea that 
everybody has to contribute to the public good under the new institution.14 
Figures 5 and 6 show the average conditional contribution for each level of average 
contribution level of the others separated by treatment, i.e., endogenous and exogenous 
minimum level, respectively. The average own contributions to the public good (y-axis) are 
plotted against the conditional average contributions of the other two group members (x-axis), 
following Fischbacher et al. (2001). As expected, there is an overall positive relationship 
between own contributions and others’ average contributions. These results show that subjects 
are on average conditional contributors since their own contribution levels increase when the 
average contributions by others increase. Interestingly, under the minimum contribution level, 
the slopes of the schedules are approximately the same as for the standard public goods 
experiment, but there is a shift in levels for a given average contribution by others. This 
corroborates the finding that minimum provision levels are effective; free riders can be forced 
to increase their contribution without ex-ante compliers reacting against the control exerted 
upon the group as a whole. The results hold if beliefs about others’ average contributions 
remain unchanged or do not decrease more than 2–3 tokens.  
Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here 
In Table 6, we follow up more closely on the individual data used in Figures 5 and 6. We 
regress own conditional contributions on others’ average contributions. In column 1, we pool 
                                                 
13 One subject in the endogenous treatment contributed less than the required minimum of 5 tokens in the MCL 
contribution table. Since all entries were below the minimum level, we treat this subject in our analyses as if she 
had contributed 5 tokens throughout the contribution table. 
14 In experiments, it is well documented that subjects on average bear a strong aversion against free riding. For 
instance, Cubitt et al. (2011) document that most people view free riding as morally reprehensible, and in games 
where peer-to-peer punishment is available, the intensity of costly punishment is usually strongly increasing in 
the receiver’s negative deviation from the group’s average contribution (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 
the sample and investigate the impact of the minimum level on the intercept and slope of the 
regression line, where the latter measures the marginal increase in contribution when others’ 
average contribution increases with one token. The MCL dummy captures the impact of the 
minimum level. For instance, when the average contribution of the other group members 
equals 5 tokens, subjects on average report an own contribution of 3.62 (1.37 + 5×0.45) 
tokens in the baseline and this number increases to 5.82 (1.37 + 5×0.45+2.57 - 5×0.07), i.e., 
by 2.22 tokens, following the implementation of the minimum level. In column 2, we 
investigate the full within-between dimension of the data, comparing differences between the 
endogenous and exogenous treatments in the effect of the minimum level on conditional 
contributions. Neither with respect to intercept (Endo × MCL) nor slope (Endo × MCL × 
Others) is the MCL effect different between the treatments, since the estimated effects are 
both small and insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence of a more pronounced minimum-level 
effect in the endogenous treatment vis-à-vis the exogenous treatment, which is in line with 
previously reported descriptive statistics. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
In more detailed analyses, we categorize subjects into contributor types following the 
convention introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001). They classified subjects into four types: 
conditional cooperators, free riders, hump-shaped contributors, and others.15 Tables 7 and 8 
show the distribution of types both in baseline and with the minimum contribution level, for 
the exogenous and endogenous treatment, respectively. The tables enable us to investigate 
type stability, which is related to the discussion about crowding in and crowding out as a 
behavioral response to the minimum-level institution, and again we can analyze this issue 
while controlling for beliefs about others’ behavior.  
Most notably, in both treatments, the share of conditional cooperators decreases whereas the 
share of free riders increases. For example, in the exogenous treatment (Table 7), the share of 
free riders increases from 17.65% in the baseline to 25.49% under the minimum level; 5.88 of 
this 7.84 percentage point increase constitute baseline conditional cooperators. Of the 64.7% 
                                                 
15 Based on their conditional contribution schedule, we define types as follows: Conditional cooperators have 
either a weakly increasing schedule or the Spearman correlation (with the others’ average contribution) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level; free riders always contribute the lowest amount allowed; hump-shaped 
contributors display a positive (negative) Spearman correlation up to (beyond) their highest contribution, both 
significant at the 1% level; and “others” do not fit into any of these categories. For a discussion on classification, 
see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
baseline conditional cooperators, only 52.94 percentage points remain under the minimum 
level. The pattern is very similar in the endogenous treatment. To fully account for behavioral 
responses, we also present, in Table 9, the type distribution when the types in the baseline are 
characterized after we manually adjust all subjects up to the minimum of 5 tokens in the 
standard public goods experiment. Thus, any remaining effect comes from subjects’ 
behavioral reaction to the implementation of the minimum level. Interestingly, when we 
characterize baseline types in relation to the adjusted minimum level, contributor types are 
remarkably stable across baseline and the minimum-level institution. For example, when a 
baseline free rider is characterized as someone who never contributes above 5 tokens (rather 
than someone who never contributes above 0 tokens), there are 25.49% free riders already in 
the exogenous baseline and thus there is no aggregate increase in the share of free riders when 
we measure types in this way. In the endogenous treatment, there is a 3.70 percentage point 
increase in the share of free riders, but this is a substantially smaller rise than the 16.05 
percentage point increase we observe in Table 8 when we use the normal type 
characterization without the adjustment of a minimum level of 5 tokens in the standard public 
goods experiment. Thus, the change in type distribution brought about by the minimum level 
seems to be an artefact of the minimum level automatically classifying weak contributors as 
free riders.16 In conjunction with the regression results in Table 6, the absence of treatment-
driven differences in the distribution of contribution types supports our main conclusion 
regarding the impact of endogenous institution formation on cooperative preferences. 
Insert Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here 
Result 6. Allowing groups to decide for themselves whether or not a minimum provision level 
should be implemented does not make individuals more cooperative. Vis-à-vis exogenous 
implementation, the opportunity to vote does not affect subjects’ cooperative preferences. 
4 Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of imposing a minimum contribution level on 
cooperative behavior. A centralized institution with exogenous imposition of rules and 
regulations of minimum levels is in many cases the only feasible option for policy makers 
since letting individuals themselves be responsible for punishment, rewards, and potentially 
                                                 
16 For instance, a conditional contributor with a positive contribution schedule that never reaches above 5 tokens 
would be classified as a free rider in Table 9 once the minimum level has been implemented. 
ostracizing others is not possible in many situations, including taxation and environment. 
Without considering behavioral responses, we would expect an imposed minimum 
contribution level to increase cooperation levels if the society consists of free riders or 
subjects who contribute a small amount. However, imposing a minimum level might add an 
additional control cost as discussed by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which could result in reduced 
contributions to the public good among subjects who already contributed above the imposed 
minimum level. Previous research has also shown that it is not only the introduction of an 
institution per se that might affect behavior, but also the way it is introduced (e.g., Dal Bó et 
al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2014a; Sutter et al., 2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).  
The objective of this paper was to investigate, by using a public goods experiment, the effect 
of (i) imposing a minimum level of contribution to a public good and (ii) the mode of 
implementation, i.e., whether the way in which the minimum level is introduced, either 
endogenously by majority voting or exogenously, affects contributions. 
We believe that a low minimum level, which we in our experiment set to 25% of the 
endowment, is the most feasible policy option since too high exogenous minimum levels 
would be met with resistance since people differ in terms of their preferences, their 
endowments, and in some cases also in their costs of contributing to the public good, e.g., 
costs of effort. In addition, too high endogenous minimum levels would likely be opposed and 
voted down for the same reasons. An alternative could be to introduce non-binding minimum 
levels, but empirical evidence indicates that non-binding announcements and promises have 
little or no effect on voluntary contributions to public goods (e.g., Bochet and Putterman, 
2009). 
Overall, our results show that a minimum contribution level has a positive and sizeable effect 
on cooperation whether imposed exogenously or endogenously. This positive effect is mainly 
due to the fact that free riders are forced to increase their contribution, while at the same time 
the contributions by those who originally contributed above the imposed minimum level were 
not crowded out. In the context of cooperation, there does not seem to be a hidden cost of 
control. This is probably linked to the fact that imposing a minimum level actually has a 
potentially positive welfare effect per se, while in the case of Falk and Kosfeld (2006) the 
control mechanism is directly linked to distrust. However, we cannot rule out a spillover effect 
of the imposed minimum level in one area on other areas with clearer elements of trust, which 
would then be an indirect negative welfare effect of the policy. 
Our findings are robust to whether the minimum contribution level is imposed exogenously or 
endogenously by voting. Thus, the overall effect of majority voting as a signal of cooperation 
does not seem to be strong in this context. An explanation is that there is an incentive for 
selfish players to vote in favor of the minimum level, since it has a potentially positive 
welfare effect per se, which makes it difficult for intrinsically cooperative individuals to 
signal their cooperative intentions by voting yes. By comparison, in Tyran and Feld (2006), 
voting for a non-deterrent law of full contribution is a strong signal of cooperative intentions 
since selfish players would vote no unless they think that there are conditional cooperators in 
the group who would take a yes vote as a signal of cooperative intentions. Likewise, in Dal 
Bó et al. (2010), the only reason a selfish player would vote to impose a fine on unilateral 
defection in a prisoners’ dilemma game would be to use it as a “bait strategy,” i.e., to signal 
that one intends to cooperate when in reality one plans to defect (since the payoff from 
defection is higher if the other player cooperates). Similarly, in Sutter et al. (2010) and 
Markussen et al. (2014a), subjects voting in favor of introducing peer-to-peer punishment 
signal their intention to make use of this mechanism in order to enforce higher levels of 
cooperation. To summarize, the main difference between our paper and for instance the four 
papers discussed above is that even if nobody wants to cooperate, there is still an incentive to 
vote yes in our setting. This is not the case in any of the other papers. 
Still, there could be reasons beyond signaling for why individuals cooperate more under 
endogenous institutions. Dal Bó et al. (2010) discuss the establishment of a cooperative norm 
and coordination as possible reasons beyond signaling, and furthermore show that signaling is 
not the main driver behind a sizeable effect of democratically chosen institutions on 
cooperation in their setting. In our setting, one such effect could be that endogenous formation 
of institutions reduces the hidden costs of control and thus has a legitimizing effect on ex-post 
cooperation. The likely explanation for an absence of such an effect is that a hidden cost of 
control seems not to be pervasive in the context of cooperation. The societal welfare effect of 
a minimum-level policy depends on a number of factors, including the perceived control cost 
and the signaling effect of voting in favor of imposing the minimum level. An important 
ingredient for the welfare effect is the composition of contributor types, and how the above 
mentioned policy variables affect this composition. Societies with a high fraction of free 
riders or where there is a strong and positive signal of increased contributions when imposing 
a minimum level will clearly benefit from the policy, while the opposite might hold for 
societies with high trust levels and a large fraction of conditional cooperators. Since minimum 
levels are used in many areas of society, it is important to understand their welfare effects, 
especially considering that the imposed minimum level often is low. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1 Results from the public goods experiments: unconditional contributions 
Treatment Standard MCLa H0: 
Standard=MCL 
(p-values) 
Exogenous (n = 51) 8.35 (6.80) 9.43 (5.47) 0.01 
Endogenous (n = 93) 8.24 (7.00) 9.09 (5.68) < 0.01 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. n = number of subjects. a For subjects in groups rejecting the endogenous 
minimum level, the minimum level is not imposed in the second stage; instead they participate in a standard 
public goods experiment. 
 
 
Table 2 Voting behavior in the endogenous treatment 
 Standard 
contr. 
Standard 
belief 
MCL 
contr. 
MCL 
belief 
H0: Standard 
contr.=MCL 
contr. (p-values) 
H0: Standard 
contr.= 
Standard belief 
(p-values) 
Exogenous 
(n = 51) 
8.35 7.76 9.43 9.57 0.01 < 0.01 
Endogenous 
(n = 93) 
8.25 7.66 9.09 9.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 
       
Endogenous: own 
and group vote 
      
-Yes/Yes (n = 72) 8.39 7.43 9.75 9.54 < 0.01 < 0.01 
- No/Yes (n = 9) 8.22 8.89 6.67 7.78 0.63 0.37 
- No/No (n = 9) 8.44 9.22 7.78 7.78 0.16 0.58 
- Yes/No (n = 3) 4.33 4.67 4.33 3.67 . 0.17 
 
 
Table 3 Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level 
 Higher in 
MCL 
No 
difference 
Lower in 
MCL 
Exogenous (n = 51) 49% 31% 20% 
Endogenous (n = 81) 43% 40% 17% 
    
Endogenous: own 
and group vote 
   
-Yes/Yes (n = 72) 44% 42% 14% 
- No/Yes (n = 9) 33% 22% 44% 
 
  
Table 4 Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level for exogenous treatment (n = 
51) 
Contributions in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Contributions in 
MCL public 
goods 
experiment 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution in 
standard public 
goods experiment 
Average 
contribution in 
minimum level 
public goods 
experiment 
0,…,4 5 23% 0.00 5.00 
0,…,4 6,…,20 2% 2.00 6.00 
5 5 6% 5.00 5.00 
5 6,…,20 8% 5.00 8.25 
6,…,20 5 12% 8.83 5.00 
6,…,20 6,…,20 49% 13.44 13.48 
 
 
Table 5 Behavioral response to imposing the minimum level for endogenous treatment (yes-
groups, n = 81) 
Contributions in 
standard public 
goods 
experiment 
Contributions in 
MCL public 
goods 
experiment 
Proportion of 
subjects 
Average 
contribution in 
standard public 
goods experiment 
Average 
contribution in 
minimum level 
public goods 
experiment 
0,…,4 5 27% 0.10 5.00 
0,…,4 6,…,20 2% 1.50 7.50 
5 5 5% 5.00 5.00 
5 6,…,20 5% 5.00 8.25 
6,…,20 5 10% 11.38 5.00 
6,…,20 6,…,20 51% 13.22 13.27 
 
  
Table 6 Cooperative preferences by treatment (linear regression) 
Dependent variable: 
Conditional contribution 
(1) (2) 
   
Constant 1.37 (0.40)*** 1.53 (0.75)** 
Others 0.45 (0.04)*** 0.44 (0.06)*** 
MCL 2.57 (0.34)*** 2.05 (0.64)*** 
MCL × Others -0.07 (0.03)** -0.03 (0.04) 
Endo - -0.26 (0.88) 
Endo × Others - -0.02 (0.08) 
Endo × MCL - 0.84 (0.74) 
Endo × MCL × Others - -0.06 (0.06) 
   
Observations 4889 4889 
- Clusters 132 132 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on individuals (in brackets). Others is the average contribution of the 
others in the group, MCL is a dummy for the second stage when the minimum level is imposed, and Endo is a 
dummy for the endogenous treatment. The dependent variable is individual i’s conditional contribution, both in 
the baseline and with the minimum provision level. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at 
the 5% level, and * significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 7 Distribution of contributor types for exogenous treatment (n =51) 
           MCL      
 
Standard 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
Free riders 
(=5) 
Hump-
shaped Others 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
50.98% 
 
 
5.88% 
 
0.00% 
 
7.84% 
 
64.70% 
 
 Free 
riders 
(=0) 
(=5) 
0.00% 
 
 
17.65% 
 
0.00% 
 
0.00% 
 
17.65% 
 
 Hump- 
shaped 
0.00% 
 
 
0.00% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.96% 
 
1.96% 
 
 Others 
 
1.96% 
 
 
1.96% 
 
0.00% 
 
11.76% 
 
15.69% 
 
  52.94% 25.49% 0.00% 21.57% 100.00% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or positive 
Spearman correlation (with others’ average contribution) at 1%; free riders: contribute the lowest amount 
allowed; hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their highest contribution. 
 
  
Table 8 Distribution of contributor types for endogenous treatment (yes-groups, n = 81) 
           MCL      
 
Standard 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
Free riders 
(=5) 
Hump-
shaped Others 
 
 Conditional 
cooperators 
41.98% 
 
 
9.88% 
 
1.23% 
 
6.17% 
 
59.26% 
 
 Free 
riders 
(=0) 
(=5) 
0.00% 
 
 
13.58% 
 
0.00% 
 
1.23% 
 
14.81% 
 
 Hump- 
shaped 
2.47% 
 
 
1.23% 
 
2.47% 
 
1.23% 
 
7.41% 
 
 Others 
 
2.47% 
 
 
6.17% 
 
0.00% 
 
9.88% 
 
18.52% 
 
  46.91% 
 
30.86% 3.70% 18.51% 100.00% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). Conditional cooperators: increasing schedule or positive 
Spearman correlation (with others’ average contribution) at 1%; free riders: contribute the lowest amount 
allowed; hump-shaped: positive (negative) Spearman correlation at 1% up to (beyond) their highest contribution. 
 
 
Table 9 Distribution of contributor types when a minimum level is manually imposed on the 
data from the standard public goods experiment 
 Exogenous 
(n = 51) 
Endogenous 
(yes-groups, n =81)  
          Standard MCL Standard MCL 
Conditional cooperators 56.86% 52.94% 54.32% 46.91% 
Free riders (=5) 25.49% 25.49% 27.16% 30.86% 
Hump-shaped 1.96% 0.00% 6.17% 3.70% 
Others 15.69% 21.57% 12.35% 18.52% 
Note: Type definition follows Fischbacher et al. (2001). In this table we define contributor types in the standard 
public goods game are after we manually adjust all subjects up to the minimum of 5 tokens in the standard public 
goods experiment. This implies that someone who never contributes above 5 tokens in the standard public goods 
experiment is characterized as a free rider. 
 
  
Fig. 1 Individual contributions in exogenous treatment (n = 51) 
 
 
Fig. 2 Individual contributions in endogenous treatment (n = 81) 
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Fig. 3 Contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions for exogenous treatment (n = 51) 
 
 
Fig. 4 Contributions and beliefs about others’ contributions for endogenous treatment (n = 81) 
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Fig. 5 Average conditional contributions for exogenous treatment (n = 51) 
 
 
Fig. 6 Average conditional contributions for endogenous treatment (n = 81) 
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